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Abstract 
How should central banks take into account movements in asset prices in the 
conduct of monetary policy? We provide an analysis to address this issue using a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating both price rigidities 
and financial market imperfections. Our findings are twofold. First, in the presence 
of these two sources of distortion in the economy, central banks face a policy 
tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and the output gap. With this tradeoff, central 
banks could strike a better balance between both objectives if they took variables 
other than inflation, such as asset prices, into consideration. Second, these benefits 
decrease when central banks rely on limited information about the underlying 
sources of asset price movements and cannot judge which part of the observed 
asset price movements reflects inefficiencies in the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Large swings in asset prices accompanied by economic disruption have frequently 
taken place in many countries, including Japan. In turn, central banks have often 
concerned themselves with how they should take into account movements in asset 
prices—comprising stock, land and housing prices—in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Currently, price stabilization is explicitly the central objective of monetary policy, with 
measures for attaining it enhanced in many countries. However, the question of how 
monetary policy can best deal with movements in asset prices has never reached a 
consensus among central bankers. 
In this paper, we theoretically analyze this issue using a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model. Rather than drawing a solid conclusion from a specific episode, our 
objective is to promote a more generally applicable understanding that will help us to 
organize the various views on how and under what conditions monetary authorities may 
benefit from taking movements in asset prices into account. In this context, we consider 
that our analysis serves as a complement to Okina and Shiratsuka (2002) and their 
review of the Japanese experience of the asset price boom and bust in the 1980s. 
One advantage of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models is that they allow 
us to compare the performance of alternative monetary policy rules in various economic 
environments. The model employed in this paper describes an economic environment 
where distortions in economic activity arise from two sources: frictions in price setting 
and financial market imperfections. Using a model including these realistic features, we 
can compare the performance of alternative monetary policy rules. 
We primarily base our analysis on Gilchrist and Saito (2008) who consider the role 
of asset prices in monetary policy using a model incorporating both financial market 
imperfections and price-setting frictions.
1 In this paper, we flesh out how a monetary 
policy tradeoff arises in the presence of financial market imperfections. Our analysis 
delivers two main findings similar to Gilchrist and Saito (2008). First, in the presence of 
financial market imperfections, economic welfare—measured a priori by the weighted 
                                                  
1  Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) conduct a similar analysis using 
the “financial accelerator” model in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). More specifically, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) discuss bubbles in asset prices while Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) 
shed light on the role of shocks to expectations by the private sector about future technology 
growth and the net worth of entrepreneurs.   2
average of the variances of the output gap and inflation—may improve when the central 
bank explicitly responds to asset prices in their monetary policy rule. This benefit could 
arise because in the model we consider, movements in asset prices closely relate to 
distortions in the economy arising from the financial market imperfections.
2 Second, 
these benefits are likely to decrease when the central bank relies on limited information 
about the underlying sources of asset price movements. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a preliminary investigation of 
the role of monetary policy in dealing with economic distortions. We proceed in a 
systematic fashion by incorporating multiple sources of distortions. These include price 
and wage rigidities and financial market imperfections. We then discuss the importance 
of the central bank’s information regarding the underlying mechanism and shocks 
behind the observed asset price developments when the central bank explicitly takes 
asset prices into account. In Section 3, we apply a model incorporating financial market 
imperfections (a variant of the “financial accelerator” model) to illustrate the potential 
benefits and costs of monetary policy that explicitly responds to asset prices. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Distortions in Economic Activity and the Role of Monetary Policy 
This section provides background to our main analysis in the following section. In 
particular, we describe several sources of distortion in economic activity and the role of 
monetary policy in attenuating these distortions. We also sketch out the bare bones of 
the financial accelerator model used in Section 3. 
2.1. Sources of Distortions in Economic Activity 
How can monetary policy improve social welfare? A theoretical response to this 
broad question relies on the following: what factors give rise to distortions in economic 
activity, what economic variables closely relate to these distortions, and to what extent 
can we use monetary policy to deal with these distortions. In the model in the following 
section, we consider an environment where a monetary authority faces two types of 
short-run distortions to resource allocation: price stickiness and financial market 
imperfections. We find that it may be possible for central banks to better deal with both 
                                                  
2 Our model assumes a closed economy and does not consider exchange rate movements and 
foreign distortions.   3
types of distortions through systematically responding to movements in asset prices, in 
addition to the more standard variables (i.e., inflation), when these movements are 
closely related to the distortions arising from financial market imperfections. 
To confirm this argument, we first explain how distortions to resource allocation 
arise in the presence of frictions in price setting by firms. Many studies based on 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models assume similar frictions. We then 
consider frictions in setting nominal wages and the resulting stickiness in nominal 
wages as additional factors that give rise to distortions in the economy. With these 
factors in mind, we discuss how monetary policy should deal with multiple sources of 
distortions arising from stickiness in both goods prices and nominal wages.
3 Finally,  we 
incorporate in the model financial market imperfections arising from asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers in financial markets, and discuss how 
movements in asset prices reflect distortions in economic activity from this particular 
type of friction. 
2.1.1. Distortions from Price-Setting Friction 
Price stability is an explicit primary objective of monetary policy in many countries, 
and regarded as a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth. Once price stability is 
lost, distortions in resource allocation could arise from the outright loss of economic 
resources because of increased price volatility, the inefficient dispersion of relative 
prices among various goods and services, and greater uncertainty regarding the future 
price level.
4 Many dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models assume that only a 
fraction of firms can adjust the prices of their products in a certain period and consider 
the resulting welfare impact of price dispersion across firms. When some firms cannot 
adjust their prices, fluctuations in the general (aggregate) price level may also give rise 
to dispersion in relative prices across producers. These dispersions in relative prices 
may then not reflect economic fundamentals in terms of the balance of supply and 
demand in the markets for goods and services, and therefore lead to short-run 
distortions in the economy. In addition, when firms have monopoly power in a 
segmented market, firms set prices above marginal costs and the level of production 
                                                  
3 In fact, our model abstracts from stickiness in nominal wages. We consider this type of 
friction here to describe the policy problem in the presence of two types of friction. 
4 A direct loss of resources may arise due to menu costs in price adjustment or “shoe leather 
costs” in the presence of fluctuations in prices and nominal interest rates (the opportunity cost of 
holding money).   4
could be below that achieved under perfect competition. This type of distortion could 
remain over a longer period where the real effects of monetary policy have completely 
tapered off. Importantly, monetary policy can only deal with the short-run distortions 
arising from price stickiness. This would suggest that other policies, such as fiscal 
policy, should take responsibility for dealing with the long-run distortions from 
monopolistic competition. 
In standard models with price-setting friction, the welfare loss function for the 
economy depends on the fluctuations in both inflation and the output gap.
5  In this paper, 
we define the output gap as the difference between the equilibrium (or actual) output 
(the level of output in the presence of price rigidities and market power by firms) and 
the efficient output (the level of output that can be achieved under an efficient allocation 
of resources in a hypothetical economy with flexible prices and perfect competition). As 
a comparison, several studies define the output gap as that between actual and natural 
output (the level of output when prices are flexible with monopolistically competing 
firms). When price stickiness is the only source of short-run distortion in the economy, 
the gap between efficient and natural output exactly matches the long-run distortion 
arising from monopolistic competition and does not vary over time.
6 In this case, the 
two types of gap—that is, deviations from (i) the natural level and (ii) the efficient 
level—always move together, and the desirable monetary policy actions to maximize 
welfare coincide under both definitions. 
Under the standard assumptions of price stickiness, and when no other factors give 
rise to short-run distortion, the following New Keynesian Phillips curve describes the 
(short-run) relationship between inflation and the output gap (defined here as the gap 
between actual and natural output): 
1 ) ( + + − = t t
n
t t t E y y π β κ π  (1) 
where  t π  is inflation in period t,  1 + t t E π  is the expectation of inflation in period t + 1 
                                                  
5 See  Woodford  (2003). 
6  The gap between actual and natural output relates to the markup (the gap between prices and 
marginal costs). As shown in the next section, we can decompose the output gap into two 
components: (i) the gap between efficient and natural output, and (ii) the gap between natural 
and actual output. The former represents long-run distortions from market power of firms and it 
is constant over time in the simple environment considered here. The latter represents the 
short-run distortions arising from frictions in price setting by firms and varies over time.   5
conditional on the information available in period t,  t y  and 
n
t y   are actual and natural 
output (expressed as the percentage deviation from the output level along a balanced 
growth path), and  κ  and β   are parameters that take positive values (β  <  1). 
Equation (1) indicates that it is possible to stabilize the gap between actual and 
natural output by stabilizing inflation (when both  t π  and  1 + t t E π  are set to zero, the 
gap between  t y  and 
n
t y   disappears). A few kinds of shocks, including the technology 
shocks we consider in the next section, affect both natural and efficient output. The gap 
between them, however, remains constant in the simple environment that we assume for 
the moment, and Equation (1) holds, even when efficient output 
e
t y  replaces natural 
output 
n
t y . In this case, monetary policy that stabilizes inflation can also stabilize the 
gap between actual and efficient output. 
When there are shocks that affect the gap between efficient and natural output (such 
as one that changes the market power of firms), replacing 
n
t y  with 
e
t y  in equation 
(1) introduces an exogenous shock term  t u   in the Phillips curve and changes (1) to: 
t t t
e
t t t u E y y + + − = +1 ) ( π β κ π . (2) 
When the shock  t u  is included, as shown in (2), a monetary policy that stabilizes 
inflation cannot completely stabilize the output gap (the gap between actual and 
efficient output). Setting  t π  and  1 + t t E π  to zero would then not necessarily result in a 
zero gap between  t y  and 
e
t y  because of the presence of the term  t u . In this case, a 
central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the output 
gap.
7 
2.1.2. Distortions from Wage-Setting Friction 
Several studies consider frictions in wage setting (some wages do not fully adjust in 
each period) in addition to the frictions in price setting considered above. In this case, 
there are two kinds of short-run distortions in resource allocation: one from frictions in 
setting wages and the other from frictions in setting prices. In addition to these short-run 
                                                  
7 The model in the next section does not include this type of shock. However, we show that a 
monetary policy tradeoff emerges in the presence of financial market imperfections, even when 
we abstract from the shock  t u .   6
distortions, there are also two kinds of long-run distortion: one arising from the market 
power of households in setting wages and the other from the presence of market power 
in the firms setting prices. 
In the presence of both price and wage rigidities, the following equations describe 
the relationship between price inflation, nominal wage inflation, the gap between actual 
and natural output, and the gap between the actual and natural level of real wages: 














t E w w y y 1 ) ( ) ( + + − − − = π β ξ κ π  (4) 
where  t w  is  the  equilibrium (or actual) level of real wages (defined as the level of real 
wages in the presence of both frictions), 
n
t w  is  the  natural level of real wages (defined 
as real wages in a hypothetical economy with no rigidities in both prices and wages), 
w
t π  is nominal wage inflation (the rate of inflation in the equilibrium/actual level of 
nominal wages), and 
p κ , 
p ξ , 
w κ  and 
w ξ  are  positive  parameters. 
In the presence of both frictions, a policy that fully stabilizes inflation does not 
ensure elimination of the gap between actual and natural output. This is because a 
policy that fully stabilizes inflation does not ensure a zero gap between actual and 
natural wages (
n
t t w w − ), and this is related to economic distortions arising from 
wage-setting frictions. In this case, setting  t π  and  1 + t t E π   to zero does not necessarily 
ensure a zero gap between  t y  and 
n
t y , as we can see from Equation (3).
8 
Even if both types of friction coexist in the economy described above, monetary 
policy can still manage the distortions in the economy by stabilizing the weighted 
average of price and nominal wage inflation (Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000). 
More formally, the objective function of monetary policy (or the welfare loss function 
of the economy) in this case depends on the variance of price inflation, wage inflation, 
and the output gap. By defining “broadly defined inflation” as the weighted average of 
price and wage inflation, we can write the welfare loss function in terms of the variance 
                                                  
8 For simplicity, we assume that there is no exogenous shock to the Phillips curve (like  t u  in 
Equation 2) and that the gap between efficient and natural level of output is constant over time.   7
of broadly defined inflation and the output gap.
9  In this case, central banks can achieve 
a zero gap between actual and natural output by stabilizing the broadly defined inflation 
rate.
 Moreover, when we abstract from exogenous shocks to the Phillips curve, the gap 
between efficient and natural output is constant over time. As a result, a policy that fully 
stabilizes broadly defined inflation can also stabilize the output gap (the gap between 
actual and efficient output). 
We could also envision the case where real wages, rather than nominal wages, 
cannot flexibly adjust due to imperfections in the labor market. In the presence of 
rigidities in real wages, the gap between efficient and natural output is no longer 
constant and varies in response to shocks to the economy (Blanchard and Gali, 2007). In 
this case, the monetary authority faces a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and the 
output gap; that is, a policy that sets inflation (or a composite of price and wage 
inflation) to zero can stabilize the gap between actual and natural output, but not 
necessarily remove the output gap (the gap between actual and efficient output). In these 
cases, the objective function of monetary policy may take a more complex form than the 
simple case and may include variables other than inflation and the output gap. Moreover, 
economic welfare may improve when the monetary authority takes into account 
movements in real variables (such as unemployment) in addition to inflation, because 
these closely relate to distortions arising from labor market frictions (Blanchard and 
Gali, 2009). 
In general, one policy instrument (for instance, nominal interest rates) is not 
sufficient to simultaneously deal with multiple short-run distortions. A policy that 
eliminates one type of distortion does then not necessarily eliminate other distortions at 
the same time. In the presence of multiple sources of distortion in economic activity, it 
is desirable to adopt a policy that strikes an appropriate balance between them. The 
model in the following section does not consider real wage rigidities or other forms of 
labor market friction. Instead, it incorporates financial market imperfections as an 
additional source of short-run distortion in economic activity alongside distortions 
arising from price-setting friction. 
2.1.3. Distortions from Financial Market Imperfections 
                                                  
9  By defining a broadly defined inflation rate, we can combine Equations (3) and (4) and write 
them as a single equation with the same form as Equation (1).   8
Many existing dynamic general equilibrium models assume an economy with a 
complete financial market where there is little interaction between asset prices and real 
economic activity.
10  However, in the presence of financial market imperfections, richer 
dynamics (generally acknowledged as the financial accelerator mechanism) emerge. 
In the absence of financial market imperfections, households and firms view all 
sources of funds as perfect substitutes.
11 In reality, however, transaction costs, taxes, 
and other structural factors (such as the asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers and limited commitment in financial contracts) may create differences in the 
costs and availability of the various financing sources. As a result, financing decisions 
may affect the spending behavior of both households and firms. 
In the presence of financial market imperfections arising from asymmetric 
information or limited commitments in financial contracts, households and firms may 
incur additional costs in raising funds externally (borrowing from a bank or issuing 
corporate bonds) and, in some cases, external financing may be restricted. In at least 
some circumstances, collateral value or the net worth of the borrowers may determine 
these additional costs or the availability of external funding. In particular, when for 
some reason the value of the borrower’s balance sheet falls, they face higher external 
financing premiums. In these cases, shocks that affect the financial positions of 
households and firms may have an additional impact on their spending behavior by 
affecting the costs of external financing or by directly limiting the availability of 
external funds. 
Consequently, financial market imperfections may amplify the effects of shocks on 
real economic activity relative to the case of perfect financial markets (where the cost or 
availability of external funds does not depend on the balance sheet conditions of 
households and firms). This amplified response by the economy to shocks reflects 
distortions in economic activity induced by the presence of financial market 
imperfections (more fundamentally, distortions resulting from asymmetric information 
or limited commitments in financial contracts). In addition to those short-run distortions 
in economic activity, financial market imperfections also give rise to long-run 
                                                  
10 For instance, the relationship between Tobin’s Q and firm investment and the wealth effects 
on household consumption, considered even in a model with a complete financial market, do 
not themselves generate richer dynamics than they do in a model with an incomplete financial 
market. 
11 In such cases, the value of a firm does not depend on its capital structure (the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem).   9
distortions similar to the case of monopolistic competition in the goods market. 
Monetary policy cannot fully offset these long-run distortions, and so there may be a 
need for other policies, like prudential and fiscal policies. In the presence of both 
financial market imperfections and price stickiness, the monetary authority may need to 
aim at dealing with multiple short-run distortions arising from both types of friction. 
In theory, the objective function of monetary policy (or the welfare loss function) in 
an economy with financial market imperfections may include variables other than 
inflation and the output gap (the gap between the actual and efficient output).
12 As the 
formal welfare loss function in an economy with financial market imperfections has not 
been discussed thoroughly in existing work, we assume a priori that it depends on the 
variance of inflation and the output gap. In other words, we assume that the welfare loss 
function takes the same form where financial markets are perfect.
13 However, even if 
we assume the same objective function as with no financial market imperfections, the 
desirable form of monetary policy may vary. In particular, we need to bear in mind that 
in the presence of financial market imperfections, a policy that aims at minimizing 
distortions arising from price rigidities may not be the best policy to deal with the 
distortions from financial market imperfections. Monetary policy may then face a 
tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and the output gap because of its overcapacity in 
coping with multiple short-run distortions with a single policy instrument. Moreover, 
when the movements in asset prices closely relate to the distortions in economic activity 
arising from financial market imperfections it may be desirable for the monetary 
authority to take account of these when making decisions on monetary policy. We stress 
that this argument remains, even if the stabilization of asset prices were not explicitly 
included in the objective function of monetary policy (or the welfare loss function of the 
                                                  
12 In the environment considered here, efficient output is the level of output in the absence of 
financial market imperfections and price rigidities. Natural output, on the other hand, is the 
level of output in the presence of financial market imperfections but in the absence of price 
rigidities. Equilibrium (or actual) output is then the level of output in the presence of both 
financial market imperfections and price rigidities. The gap between efficient and natural output 
reflects both short-run distortions from financial market imperfections and long-run distortions 
arising from the market power of firms in setting prices as well as financial market 
imperfections. In the presence of financial market imperfections, the gap is not constant and 
varies in response to shocks. 
13 The formal welfare loss function may include financial variables in addition to inflation and 
the output gap. This strengthens our finding in the following section that monetary policy may 
benefit from taking into account information about asset prices in the presence of financial 
market imperfections. In addition, as the presence of financial market imperfections assumes, in 
many theories, the existence of heterogeneous agents in the economy, the formal welfare loss 
function may be a composite of the welfare functions of these agents.   10
economy).
14 
We now briefly describe how we incorporate financial market imperfections into 
our model, primarily based on Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The model 
assumes asymmetric information between borrowers (entrepreneurs) and lenders. We 
assume the lenders pay nonzero costs to audit the borrower’s ability to repay the funds 
lent.
15 The key implication of financial market imperfections is that the premium on 
external funds (the difference between the cost of funds raised externally and the 
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where 
K R  is the rate of return on borrowers’ capital and  R  is the rate of return on 
risk-free assets. As the expected rate of return on capital is equal to the cost of external 
funds in equilibrium, the left-hand side of (5) represents the external finance premium 
(the ratio of the cost of external funds and the opportunity cost of internal funds).  N  is 
the net worth of borrowers and  K  is the capital stock (assets of borrowers in the 
model). Accordingly,  K N  on the right-hand side of (5) represents the ratio of net 
worth to total assets of borrowers (the inverse of leverage). Equation (5) indicates that 
the external finance premium falls when the balance sheet conditions of borrowers 
improve. We note that an optimal contract between borrowers and lenders could 
underpin Equation (5). 
Equation (5) holds in both the short and long run (i.e., at the steady state). This 
indicates that the positive external finance premium does not dissipate, even in the long 
run. Consequently, in the steady state the amount of borrowing and the amount of 
investment in capital stock by entrepreneurs remains below the level that would prevail 
                                                  
14 In theory, variables other than asset prices may also relate closely to the distortions in 
economic activity arising from financial market imperfections. Taking into account these 
variables in the conduct of monetary policy may then also be beneficial. Despite this, in this 
paper we focus on whether we should consider asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy. 
15 There are alternative ways to incorporate financial market imperfections into a model. The 
model developed in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) also assumes asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders, although it has a slightly different structure from Bernanke et al. (1999). 
Alternatively, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) assume limited commitment in financial contracts. 
Iacoviello (2005) extends Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and studies the relationship between 
housing prices, business cycles, and monetary policy. Faia and Monacelli (2007) study the role 
of asset prices in monetary policy using the model in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).   11
in the absence of financial market imperfections (i.e., when the external finance 
premium is zero). It is beyond the capacity of monetary policy to deal with this type of 
long-run distortion. 
We can now rewrite Equation (5) to obtain the following short-run relationship 
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where  t Q  is the relative price of capital (the “asset price” in the model). This 
corresponds with Tobin’s Q and can vary endogenously. 
Equation (6) points to a mechanism such that in the short-run financial market 
imperfections can amplify the effects of aggregate shocks on real economic activity. The 
outright source of this amplification mechanism lies in the inverse relationship between 
the external finance premium and borrowers’ balance sheet conditions. As noted earlier, 
this amplification mechanism fundamentally reflects the short-run distortions in 
economic activity resulting from the financial market imperfections. We should also 
stress that monetary policy has the potential to deal with this type of short-run 
distortion. 
The rate of return on capital 
K















where  δ  denotes the depreciation rate and  1 + t D  is the marginal product of capital in 
period t + 1.
16 Equation (6) is an ex ante relationship that holds before the aggregate 
shocks occur in period  1 + t  while Equation (7) is an ex post relationship that holds 
after the aggregate shocks in period  1 + t . 
                                                  
16  Iterative substitutions in (7) yield  ) /( ) 1 ( 1
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j
t R D Q δ . This implies that asset 
prices  t Q  depend on the discounted values of future dividends. Note that in general 
equilibrium, both dividends and the discount rate  m t R +  are determined endogenously. For 
example, when the growth rate of the economy increases following a shock to technology 
growth, the discount rate rises and this partly negates the positive effects of the increase in 
dividends on asset prices.   12
In the presence of financial market imperfections, the effects of exogenous shocks 
on real economic activity amplify through procyclical movements in the balance sheet 
condition of borrowers and countercyclical movements in the external finance premium. 
Put simply, the widely acknowledged financial accelerator mechanism is in action in 
this model. To see this point in detail, suppose there is an unexpected decline in asset 
prices  t Q  in the wake of some adverse shock. Investment decreases along with the 
decline in asset prices. A lower than expected rate of return on capital 
K
t R  following 
the decline in asset prices then damages entrepreneurs’ net worth  1 + t N . This causes 
deterioration in the balance sheet conditions of borrowers and the external finance 
premium increases. Prompted by the increase in the external finance premium, firms 
scale back their investment; ultimately, asset prices are likely to fall further. As 
discussed, a kind of multiplier effect is in action, and this amplifies the magnitude of the 
initial shock. The amplified response of the economy to exogenous shocks then reflects 
the presence of the distortions in economic activity arising from the financial market 
imperfections. 
The financial accelerator mechanism described above tends to magnify fluctuations 
in inflation and the output gap. Because the movements in asset prices are closely 
related to this particular mechanism, taking into account movements in asset prices in 
the conduct of monetary policy may be beneficial in minimizing inefficient movements 
in inflation and the output gap. In the following section, we simulate the model to 
illustrate this point. 
2.2. Mechanism and Shocks behind Asset Price Movements 
In theory, and as described earlier and in detail in the following section, when 
fluctuations in asset prices closely relate to the short-run distortions arising from 
financial market imperfections, there may be potential benefits from taking into account 
the movements in asset prices in monetary policy. In practice, however, this may 
involve a number of difficulties, especially when the central bank does not have enough 
information about the nature and sources of asset price movements. Central banks may 
then wish to be well equipped with sufficient information on both the underlying shock 
and the mechanism that result in the observed asset price development. 
Regarding the mechanism behind the asset price movements, many studies in the 
literature assume some sort of capital adjustment costs as central to generating the richer   13
dynamics of asset prices (note that asset price here is the relative price of capital when 
firm’s assets consist of capital stock only).
17   Some models explicitly include 
misalignment in asset prices in an attempt to create bubbles (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 
1999). Our model includes the amplification mechanism from the financial accelerator, 
but does not assume the existence of bubbles. To understand better the relationship 
between the movements in asset prices and real economic activity, central banks require 
information about the mechanism that generates asset price movements. In practice, the 
uncertainty regarding the mechanism underlying asset price movements tends to be 
greater than that behind observed inflation or other variables usually of interest to 
central banks. 
Information about the underlying shocks that drive asset prices plays an essential 
role for central banks when we assume that they are making monetary policy decisions 
by taking account of the information contained in asset prices. In particular, when the 
central bank attempts to infer the efficient level of asset prices, they need to identify 
accurately the shocks to the economy, as any policy action based on imprecise estimates 
may destabilize the economy. In the next section, we consider an environment where 
there are two types of shocks to technology growth that only differ with respect to their 
persistence (one is transitory and the other is persistent) and assume the central bank is 
unable to distinguish between these shocks on a real-time basis. We illustrate that in 
such cases the potential costs may exceed the benefits of considering asset price 
movements in the conduct of monetary policy. 
3. Benefits and Costs of Taking into Account Asset Price Movements 
In this section, we simulate the model to illustrate the potential benefits and costs of 
considering movements in asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy. We base this 
on the model in Bernanke et al. (1999) that incorporates financial market imperfections 
in an otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. See Gilchrist 
and Saito (2008) and the Appendix for a description. While our analysis draws on 
Gilchrist and Saito (2008), we discuss the monetary policy tradeoffs arising from 
financial market imperfections in detail. 
As a driving force behind macroeconomic fluctuations, we consider shocks to 
                                                  
17  Similarly, several studies use a two-sector model including both a consumption goods sector 
and an investment goods sector to account for movements in the relative price of capital (asset 
prices in those models).   14
technology along with shocks to the net worth of entrepreneurs that have outright 
effects on their balance sheets.
18 An important difference between these shocks for the 
purpose of our analysis is the deviation in economic activity from its efficient level. To 
appreciate this point, we can see that even in the absence of nominal rigidities and real 
imperfections (such as financial market imperfections), the level of economic activity 
varies in response to technology shocks. However, net worth shocks have no impact on 
the efficient level of economic activity. This outcome reflects the fact that in the absence 
of financial market imperfections, balance sheet conditions are irrelevant to economic 
activity (or the decisions of firms/investors). 
3.1. Monetary Policy Rules 
We assume that the central bank relies on the short-term interest rate as its main 
policy instrument and follows an interest rate rule. We consider various interest rate 
rules and compare their performance as measured by the variance of inflation and the 
output gap. 
The first policy rule that we consider is: 
t
n
t r π φπ
~ ~ = , 
where 
n
t r ~  is the short-term nominal interest rate (the policy interest rate),  t π ~  is the 
inflation rate between period t-1 and period t, and  π φ  is a response parameter that 
determines the extent to which the central bank adjusts interest rates to inflation. 
The second policy rule we consider includes both inflation and the “asset price 
gap.” We define the asset price gap as the deviation of the equilibrium (or actual) level 
of asset prices from the efficient level. The equilibrium level of asset prices is the 
actual/observed level in the presence of both price rigidities and financial market 
imperfections. The efficient level of asset prices is then the level of prices that would 
materialize if the prices of goods and services could adjust flexibly and financial 
markets are perfect. With these concepts, the alternative rule is given by 
) ~ ~ ( ~ ~ *
t t q t
n
t q q r − + = φ π φπ , 
                                                  
18  Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) consider net worth shocks.   15
where  t q ~  is the equilibrium level of asset prices in period t while 
* ~
t q  denotes their 
efficient level in period t, both in terms of the percentage deviation from the balanced 
growth path. Accordingly, 
* ~ ~
t t q q −  represents the asset price gap.  q φ  is another 
response parameter of the central bank to the asset price gap. 
3.2. Financial Market Imperfections and Monetary Policy Tradeoffs 
We provide a few simulation results to illustrate that in the presence of financial 
market imperfections, complete inflation stabilization would not necessarily achieve a 
zero output gap, and thus the monetary authority faces a policy tradeoff. 
In the economy considered in this paper, we define natural output as the level of 
output in the absence of price stickiness but in the presence of financial market 
imperfections, and efficient output as the level of output in the absence of both price 
stickiness and financial market imperfections.
19 Note that controlling these two 
potential output levels lies beyond the capacity of monetary policy; that is, they are 
unaffected by changes in nominal interest rates. 
Let  t y ~ , 
n
t y ~ , and 
e
t y ~ , respectively, denote equilibrium (or actual) output, natural 
output, and efficient output, each in terms of the percentage deviation from their 
balanced growth path. We can then decompose the percentage deviation in the output 
gap, where the output gap is the gap between actual and efficient output, into two 
components: 







t t y y y y y y − + − = − . (8) 
The first term on the right-hand side,  ) ~ ~ (
n
t t y y − , denotes the gap between actual and 




t y y − , stands for the gap between natural and 
efficient output. In our model, which includes both price-setting frictions and financial 
                                                  
19 More generally, natural output is defined as the level of output in the economy without any 
nominal rigidities, but in the presence of some form of real imperfections (e.g., search frictions 
in the labor market, real wage stickiness, financial market imperfections). Efficient output is 
defined as the level of output in the economy without any nominal rigidities or real 
imperfections. See Woodford (2003) for a definition of natural and efficient output, and 
Blanchard and Gali (2007) for application of these concepts in an economy with real wage 
rigidities. See also Ravenna and Walsh (2008) for an analysis of an economy with labor market 
frictions.   16
market imperfections, the first term represents the distortion in resource allocation 
arising from price stickiness while the second term represents the distortion due to 
financial market imperfections. Note that in the presence of financial market 
imperfections or other forms of real imperfections/frictions, such as real wage rigidities, 
the second term endogenously fluctuates in response to exogenous shocks to the 
economy (such as technology shocks). 
The first term on the right-hand side of (8) shrinks to zero under a monetary policy 
that fully stabilizes inflation, while the second term is unaffected by monetary policy 
actions and fluctuates in response to exogenous shocks to the economy. Consequently, 
in the presence of financial market imperfections, we cannot keep the output gap at zero 
under a policy that fully stabilizes inflation; the central bank then faces a tradeoff 
between the stabilization of inflation and the output gap. We present several simulation 
results to highlight this point below. 
Fig. 1 presents the responses of equilibrium (or actual) output ( t y ~ ), natural output 
(
n
t y ~ ), efficient output (
e
t y ~ ), and inflation to a shock that temporarily raises technology 
growth by one percent. Each variable is expressed as the percentage deviation from the 
balanced growth path. The response of actual output ( t y ~ ) to the shock depends on the 
type of monetary policy rule adopted. We consider three types of monetary policy rules: 
namely, a policy rule that weakly responds to inflation ( t
n
t r π ~ 1 . 1 ~ = ), a policy rule with a 
strong response to inflation ( t
n
t r π ~ 0 . 2 ~ = ), and a policy rule that strongly responds to 
asset prices as well as inflation ( ) ~ ~ ( 5 . 0 ~ 0 . 2 ~ *
t t t
n
t q q r − + = π ). Fig. 1 labels these as 
“Weak,” “Strong”, and “Asset”, respectively. The labeled responses of natural and 
efficient output are “Natural” and “Efficient.” 
Fig. 1 shows that by making the policy response to inflation stronger (by moving 
from “Weak” to “Strong”), both inflation and the gap between actual and natural output 
) ~ ~ (
n
t t y y −   can be broadly minimized. In the presence of financial market imperfections, 
however, a policy rule that completely stabilizes inflation does not necessarily ensure 
the elimination of the output gap between the actual and efficient level. The unfilled gap 
reflects the deviation of the natural output level from the efficient level, and as we 
discussed so far, we cannot remove this gap between these two notions of output by a 
monetary policy rule that fully stabilizes inflation. 
Contrarily, in the absence of financial market imperfections (not shown), the gap   17
between the natural and efficient level of output remains unchanged in response to 




t y y ) holds in Equation (8).
20 In this case, a policy rule 
that responds strongly to inflation completely stabilizes both inflation and the output 
gap, and there is no policy tradeoff. 
Fig. 1 also includes the response of output and inflation when the policy rule 
explicitly responds to the asset price gap (labeled as “Asset”). The output gap can be 
reduced under this policy, but this comes at the cost of increasing the deviation of 
inflation from zero (the target inflation rate). This result reconfirms that monetary policy 
faces a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and the output gap in the presence of 
financial market imperfections. In this particular case, the “Asset” rule outperforms the 
“Strong” rule in terms of output gap stabilization while it fails to minimize the variance 
of inflation.
21 
We obtain similar results in our model where we simulate shocks to net worth. Fig. 
2 presents the response of output and inflation to a positive shock to the net worth of 
entrepreneurs. As in the case of technology shocks, by strengthening the policy response 
to inflation (from “Weak” to “Strong”), the response of output can broadly mimic the 
path of natural output and the response of inflation can be brought closer to zero (the 
target inflation rate). However, we cannot reduce the gap between natural and efficient 
output by monetary policy action alone. In this case, a policy rule that stabilizes 
inflation completely does not necessarily ensure the elimination of the output gap (the 
gap between actual and efficient output). 
In a similar vein, and as in the case of technology shocks, when the monetary 
authority takes into account movements in asset prices in addition to movements in 
                                                  
20  In the absence of financial market imperfections, the difference between natural and efficient 
output is due to the presence of markups introduced by imperfect competition. When prices are 
flexible, markups remain unchanged in response to shocks (although not zero), and as a result 
the gap between the natural and efficient output remains unchanged. In this case, the percentage 
deviation in natural output from its balanced growth path (“Natural” in the figure) coincides 
with the deviation in efficient output (“Efficient” in the figure). 
21 Here, we focus on a particular policy rule that includes the asset price gap (in addition to 
inflation). We obtain similar results when we consider a policy rule that includes the output gap. 
A general point is that by letting the monetary authority respond to variables other than inflation, 
economic outcomes may improve. This additional variable can be the asset price gap (as in our 
simulation), the output gap, the external finance premium, or the leverage of entrepreneurs. We 
focus on the additional role of asset prices in monetary policy here. One important avenue for 
future research is to consider under what conditions asset prices provide useful information for 
the central bank that it cannot obtain from other variables, such as the output gap.   18
inflation (“Asset” in the figure), the output gap can better be stabilized, but again this 
comes partly at the cost of losing inflation stability. 
We have so far discussed one-off shocks to technology or net worth. We now 
conduct stochastic simulations using the same model to see whether we can essentially 
reconfirm the conclusion that we have reached so far, even in the situation where shocks 
are hitting the economy continuously. 
Note that we can decompose the variance of the output gap ( ) ~ ~ var(
e
t t y y − ) into three 
components as in Equation (9) below: (i) the variance of the gap between actual and 
natural output ( ) ~ ~ var(
n
t t y y − ), (ii) the variance of the gap between natural and efficient 




t y y − ), and (iii) the (doubled) covariance between the gap between 
actual and natural output and the gap between natural and efficient output 






t t y y y y − − ). 














t t y y y y y y y y y y − − + − + − = −  (9) 
We can interpret the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (9) as 
representing the distortions in economic activity arising from nominal rigidities. 
Likewise, we can interpret the second term as representing the distortions due to 
financial imperfections. In the absence of price rigidities, the first term is zero, while in 
the absence of financial market imperfections, the second term is zero. The third term 
on the right-hand side of Equation (9) collapses to zero if either prices are flexible or 
financial markets are perfect. 
Table 1 shows the simulated variance of the output gap and inflation together with 
their decompositions according to Equation (9) in the model economy with stochastic 
technology shocks. Clearly, the variance of the gap between natural and efficient output 




t y y − ) does not vary across the three monetary policy rules as the value stays 
constant at 0.393 under all policy rules considered. 
The upper two rows of Table 1 show that both the variance of the gap between 
actual and natural output ( ) ~ ~ var(
n
t t y y − ) and the variance of inflation can be reduced by 
raising the policy response parameter to inflation. When the policy response to inflation 
is extremely strong (the bottom row in Table 1), we can reduce both the variance of the 
gap between actual and natural output and the variance of inflation to nearly zero.   19
However, as noted earlier, monetary policy cannot address the gap between natural and 
efficient output, and the output gap defined as the gap between the actual and efficient 
output cannot be completely stabilized under a policy that achieves the full stabilization 
of inflation. More specifically, Table 1 suggests that it is not possible to reduce the 
variance of the output gap below the variance of the gap between natural and efficient 
output (0.393) under a monetary policy rule that responds only to inflation. 






t t y y y y − − ) takes a 
negative value, it may be possible to reduce the variance of the output gap 
( ) ~ ~ var(
e
t t y y − ) to a level below the variance of the gap between actual and natural output 
( ) ~ ~ var(
n
t t y y − ). The lower part of Table 1 shows that the covariance may take a negative 
value under a policy rule that responds to the asset price gap.
22 Moreover, the 
covariance decreases as the interest rate responds more strongly to the asset price gap. A 
policy rule with an interest rate responding to both inflation and the asset price gap can 
then reduce the output gap variance relative to where the policy responds only to 
inflation. However, this benefit comes at the cost of increasing the volatility of inflation. 
These results reinforce our finding that the central bank faces a tradeoff between the 
stabilization of inflation and the output gap in the presence of financial market 
imperfections. Table 1 also shows the welfare loss defined as the weighted average of 
the inflation and output gap variance. Under the parameter values set in our model, if 
the monetary policy moderately responds to the asset price gap (with a coefficient on 
the asset price gap of around 1.0), it would be welfare improving. 
The results are similar in the case of net worth shocks. Table 2 presents the variance 
of the output gap (as well as its decomposition) and the variance of inflation in an 
economy with net worth shocks. As in the case of technology shocks, we can stabilize 
inflation by a policy rule that responds strongly to inflation. In the presence of financial 
market imperfections, however, we cannot reduce to zero the variance of the output gap 
under such a policy rule. Table 2 also indicates that by including the asset price gap in 
the policy rule, the variance of the output gap can decrease, but again this comes at the 
cost of increasing the variance of inflation. These results suggest that in line with the 
                                                  
22  The impulse response in Fig. 1 shows that this covariance is indeed negative. Under a policy rule 
with the asset price gap (“Asset”), the response of the equilibrium (or actual) output to a technology 
shock is smaller than the response of the natural output to the same shock ( ) ~ ~ (
n
t t y y −  takes a 




t y y −  
takes a positive value). As a result, the covariance between  ) ~ ~ (
n




t y y −  is  negative.   20
earlier simulation results, monetary authorities face policy tradeoffs in the presence of 
financial market imperfections. Table 2 also indicates, as in the case of technology 
shocks, a moderate response to the asset price gap could improve economic welfare. 
3.3. Costs of Considering Asset Price Movements 
So far, we have assumed that the central bank can correctly calculate the efficient 
level of asset prices (
* ~
t q ) and use this as an input in monetary policy decisions. In reality, 
however, the central bank may not possess all the information required to calculate the 
efficient level of asset prices. In such situations, monetary policy rules that rely on the 
central bank’s inferences about the asset price gapthe gap between actual asset prices 
and the central bank’s inference about the efficient level of asset pricesmay not 
perform well. 
In order to illustrate this point, Gilchrist and Saito (2008) consider an economy 
where there are two types of shocks to technology growth (one transitory and the other 
persistent) and the central bank does not observe these shocks separately. They further 
assume that the central bank makes inferences about the realization of the transitory and 
persistent shocks to technology growth using a Kalman filter, infers the efficient level of 
asset prices, and then uses it as an input to monetary policy. The central bank is assumed 
to adopt a monetary policy rule of the form  ) ~ ~ ( ~ ~ *
t t q t
n
t q q r − + = φ π φπ  where 
* ~
t q  now 
represents the central bank’s inferences about the efficient level of asset prices. 
Table 3 presents simulation results similar to those contained in Gilchrist and Saito 
(2008). As shown in the left-hand side columns in the table (those labeled “Economy 
with Price Stickiness Only”), when the central bank has limited information about the 
efficient level of asset prices, there is no gain from including the asset price gap in the 
monetary policy rule in the absence of financial market imperfections. In fact, the 
welfare loss, calculated as the weighted average of the inflation and output gap variance, 
becomes larger when the central bank takes into account movements in the asset price 
gap. This is because the central bank’s inferences about the asset price gap are 
inaccurate when the central bank has limited information about the underlying sources 
of asset price movements (exogenous shocks in the economy). 
As discussed earlier, including the asset price gap in the monetary policy rule can 
be beneficial in the presence of financial market imperfections. We can see this, at least   21
partially, from the right-hand side columns in Table 3 (the columns labeled “Economy 
with Price Stickiness and Financial Market Imperfections”). The variance of output gap 
decreases as the policy response to the asset price gap becomes larger. The benefits arise 
because by responding to the asset price gap, the central bank can at least partially deal 
with the inefficiencies in the economy due to the presence of financial market 
imperfections. However, these benefits reduce to the extent that the central bank’s 
inferences about the efficient level of asset prices are inaccurate. We can see this by 
comparing Table 1 (where the central bank can correctly calculate the efficient level of 
asset prices) and Table 3 (the situation of limited information held by the central bank). 
When the central bank has limited information in calculating the efficient level of asset 
prices, both the variance of inflation and the variance of the output gap are larger when 
compared with the case where the central bank is not subject to such an information 
problem. When the central bank has limited information, a policy rule that does not 
require the central bank’s inferences about the efficient level of asset prices may 
perform better. Such policy rules may include the growth rate of observed asset prices 
instead of the asset price gap.
23 
3.4. Future Directions 
There are at least two outstanding issues related to the analysis in this section. The 
first is theoretical. We assumed throughout this section that the welfare loss is measured 
by the weighted average of the output gap variance and the inflation variance.
24 In 
theory, the welfare loss function may include other variables, and no one has thus far 
derived a formal welfare function for an economy with the type of financial frictions 
considered in this paper.
25 In addition, the weights attached to the variance of inflation 
and the variance of the output gap in the welfare loss function is arbitrarily set at 0.5 in 
our analysis. In theory, the weights can differ from the values we imposed. Using the 
appropriate welfare loss function and weights on the arguments is important in 
evaluating, at least in theory, how large the monetary policy response to the movements 
in asset prices should be. 
The second issue is empirical. We have illustrated that a desirable form of monetary 
policy rule differs depending on whether financial markets are perfect or imperfect. It is 
                                                  
23  See Gilchrist and Saito (2008) for further discussion. 
24  Bernanke and Gertler (1999) use a similar approach. 
25 See Faia and Monacelli (2007), Curdia and Woodford (2008, 2009), and Carlstrom, Fuerst, 
and Paustian (2009) for recent research developments in this area.   22
thus important to assess the degree of financial market imperfections in the actual 
economy. In particular, it is interesting to see how the degree of financial market 
imperfections differ across countries and change over time in a certain country,
26 and 
connect these observations to differences in the desirable form of monetary policy rule 
across countries, and how these change over time within a country. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy using 
a dynamic general equilibrium model with financial market imperfections. Many 
previous studies on this topic have emphasized the costs rather than the benefits arising 
from lean-against-the-wind type monetary policies.
27  In fact, no central bank appears to 
adjust interest rates in response to movements in asset prices in a systematic manner. 
The analysis in this paper suggests that when movements in asset prices closely relate to 
inefficiencies in the economy, which is the case in the presence of financial market 
imperfections, there may be potential benefits from taking into account movements in 
asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy. We also find that the benefits decrease 
when the monetary authority has limited information in judging which part of the 
observed movements in asset prices reflects these inefficiencies. 
                                                  
26  Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2008) and Queijo von Heideken (2008) estimate a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model with financial market imperfections similar to that used in 
this paper using both U.S. and Euro area data. Queijo von Heideken (2008) particularly finds 
that financial frictions are greater in the Euro area. 
27  There are pros and cons to this argument. Some studies argue that when the central bank does 
not recognize bubbles in asset prices in a timely manner and when there are some uncertainties 
in the effects of monetary policy on bubbles, it may not be desirable for monetary policy to 
respond excessively to asset price movements (Bernanke and Gertler 1999; Kohn 2006). Others, 
however, advocate the potential benefits of lean-against-the-wind policies and more generally 
stress the importance of the stability in financial system in the context of monetary policy 
(Borio and White 2004).   23
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Appendix 1: The Financial Accelerator Model 
This section presents the equilibrium conditions of the model and the parameter 
values.
28 
1.1. Equilibrium Conditions 
In the model, technology is nonstationary, and accordingly, macroeconomic 
variables such as consumption and investment are nonstationary. We can show that 
along the balanced growth, consumption (C), investment (I), output (Y), capital stock 
(K), and the net worth of entrepreneurs (N) grow at the same rate as technology. As a 
result, these variables divided by the level of technology are stationary. Let c, i, y, k, and 
n denote consumption, investment, output, capital stock, and the net worth of 
entrepreneurs, each divided by the level of technology (A). These variables are constant 
along the balanced growth path. Writing the percentage deviations of the normalized 
variables from the balanced growth path as c ~ ,  i ~ ,  y ~,  k
~
, and n ~ , the percentage 
deviation of technology growth from the balanced growth path as  z ~ , and the deviation 
of inflation rate from 0% as  π ~, we can write the equilibrium conditions of the model as 
(A1)–(A11) below.
29  Variables with subscript t denote the variables observed in period t. 
Variables with conditional expectations operator ( t E ) denote the expected values 
conditional on information available in period t. Variables without time subscript denote 
constant values along the balanced growth. 
Equation (A1) is the Euler equation for households: 
  1 1 1 1
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
+ + + + − + − − = − t t
n





+  is the nominal interest rate that is set by the central bank in period t (see 
Section 3 for a description of the monetary policy rules). 
Equation (A2) states that the expected rate of return on capital (
k
t tr E 1
~
+ ) is the sum of 
marginal product of capital and capital gains: 
                                                  
28  See Gilchrist and Saito (2008) for details. 
29  We assume that the rate of inflation on the balanced growth path is 0%.   26
t t t



















) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
) ~ ~ ~ ~ (




















where  t q ~  is asset prices and  t c m ~  is the real marginal cost (the inverse of markup), 
both in deviations from the balanced growth path. 
Equation (A3) defines the external finance premium ( t s ~ ) as the difference between 
the expected rate of return on capital and the expected rate of return on risk-free assets: 
) ~ ~ ( ~ ~




t t t E r r E s π . (A3) 
Equation (A4) states that the external finance premium is increasing in the leverage 
of entrepreneurs: 
) ~ ~ ~ ( ~
1 1 + + − + = t t t t n k q s χ , (A4) 
where  χ   is a positive parameter. 
Equation (A5) describes the evolution of the net worth of entrepreneurs: 
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 − − = − + . (A5) 
Net worth at the end of period t ( 1
~
+ t n ) is the net worth at the end of period t − 1 ( t n ~ ) 
plus the return on capital from period t − 1 to period t (
k
t r ~ ) minus the repayment on the 
loan (
k
t t r E ~
1 − ).  t nw, ε  is a shock to net worth (similar to that considered in Gilchrist and 
Leahy (2002)). This shock is assumed to be i.i.d. with a normal distribution. 
Equation (A6) expresses the relationship between investment and asset prices 
(relative price of capital, or Tobin’s Q): 
) ~ ~ ~ ( ~
t t t k t z k i q + − =η , (A6)   27
where  k η   is a positive parameter. 
Equation (A7) states that the aggregate demand for goods and services consists of 
consumption ( t c ~ ) and investment ( t i ~ ): 






y ~ ~ ~ + = . (A7) 
Equation (A8) is the production function that relates the aggregate supply of goods 
and services to labor input ( t h
~
), capital stock, and total factor productivity: 
t t t t z k h y ~ ) 1 (
~
) 1 (
~ ~ α α α − − − + = , (A8) 
where  α   is a positive parameter. 
Equation (A9) is the equilibrium condition in the labor market: 
t t t t h c c m y
~
) 1 ( ~ ~ ~ γ + = − + , (A9) 
where  γ   is a positive parameter that is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity. 





+ + = t t t t E c m π β κ π , (A10) 
where  κ  is a positive parameter and  β  is a positive parameter associated with the 
subjective discount factor of households. 
Equation (A11) describes the evolution of the capital stock: 



















where  δ   is the depreciation rate. 
                                                  
30 The deviation of the real marginal cost from the balanced growth path corresponds to the 
output gap (the gap between actual output and natural output). Equation (A10) corresponds to 
Equation (1) in Section 2.   28
We assume that two types of shocks to technology growth occur in each period. 
One has a transitory impact on technology growth ( t ε ), and the other has a persistent 
impact on technology growth ( t v ). We characterize the process of technology growth by 
the following equations: 
t t t d z ε + =
~ ~    ) , 0 ( . . . ~
2
ε σ ε N d i i t  
t t d t v d d + = −1
~ ~
ρ  ) , 0 ( . . . ~
2
ν σ N d i i vt  
where  t z ~  is the growth rate of technology and  t d
~
 is the persistent component of 
technology growth, both in terms of percentage deviations from balanced growth path. 
Several other studies use a similar characterization of the stochastic process of 
technology growth.
31 
In addition to the equations listed above, the monetary policy rule constitutes the 
system of equilibrium conditions (see Section 3 for a description of the monetary policy 
rules). 
1.2. Parameters 
The labor share (α ) is 0.642. The subjective discount factor (β ) is 0.995. The 
preference parameter (γ ) is chosen so that the labor supply elasticity ( γ / 1 ) is 2.7373 
( 3654 . 0 = γ ).
32 The depreciation rate of capital (δ ) is 2.1% per quarter ( 021 . 0 = δ ), 
and the parameter related to capital adjustment costs is  25 . 0 = k η  as in Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). 
The parameter related to the market power of firms is set so that the price markup 
along the balanced growth is 10% ( 11 = ε ), while the parameter related to the price 
stickiness is set so that price adjustments occur with a probability of 25% every quarter 
( 75 . 0 = ν ), as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The former relates to the 
distortion in long-term resource allocation introduced by the market power of firms. The 
latter relates to the distortion in the short-term resource allocation due to price rigidities. 
                                                  
31  See, for instance, Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2007). 
32 These parameter values are from Fukunaga (2002), who calibrates a similar model for the 
Japanese economy.   29
0 = ν  corresponds to the special case of flexible prices. The resource allocation in the 
flexible price economy is identical to the allocation when the real marginal costs remain 
unchanged ( t c m ~  =  0).
33 
Regarding the parameters related to financial market imperfections, the sensitivity 
of the external finance premium to the entrepreneur’s leverage is  05 . 0 = χ , as in 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The ratio of capital stock to the net worth of 
entrepreneurs on the balanced growth path ( n k / ) is set to 1.982 based on Japanese 
data.
34 0 = χ  corresponds to the special case of no financial market imperfections, in 
which case the external finance premium is constant at zero ( 0 ~ = t s ), as we can see from 
Equation (A4). 
Regarding the parameters related to the stochastic process of technology, the 
standard deviations of technology shocks are set to the same values as those in Gilchrist 
and Saito (2008). The standard deviation of the shocks to the persistent component of 
technology growth ( v σ ) is 0.001, while the standard deviation of the shocks to the 
transitory component ( ε σ ) is 0.01. The autocorrelation of the persistent component of 
technology growth ( d ρ ) is 0.5. Under these parameterizations, the Kalman gain (λ ) is 
0.0131. Finally, the standard deviation of net worth shocks ( nw σ ) is 0.01. 
Appendix 2: Financial Market Imperfections and Policy Tradeoffs 
In Section 3, we saw that in the presence of both price rigidities and financial 
market imperfections the central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and 
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33  When prices are flexible, we replace Equation (A10) with  0 ~ = t c m . 
34  Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) use a slightly smaller value ( n k /  =  1.8).   30
Equation (B1) is the Phillips curve (the same as Equation (A10) in Appendix 1), 
and Equation (B2) is derived from Equations (A2) and (A3) in Appendix 1. 
Note that when prices are flexible, there are no fluctuations in the markup and the 
real marginal cost ( 0 ~ = t c m ). Note also that in the absence of financial market 
imperfections, the external finance premium is constant at zero ( 0 ~ = t s ). 
As we can see from Equation (B1), the real marginal cost completely stabilizes 
under a policy rule that achieves the complete stabilization of inflation. Stabilizing the 
real marginal cost completely, however, does not necessarily ensure the complete 
stabilization of the external finance premium and the output gap.
35  We can see this from 
Equation (B2): even if prices and the real marginal cost completely stabilize, 
fluctuations in the external finance premium (deviations in  t s ~  from zero) lead to 
deviations in real variables (such as output) from their efficient levels (the levels that 
would prevail in the absence of price rigidities and in the absence of financial market 
imperfections). In other words, even if  t c m ~  is zero, the level of output in the presence 
of financial market imperfections (the level of output when  t s ~  is not zero in Equation 
(B2)) would be different from that in the absence of financial market imperfections (the 
level of output when  t s ~  is zero). Accordingly, in the presence of financial market 
imperfections (that is, when the external finance premium varies in response to shocks), 
complete stabilization of inflation does not necessarily ensure the elimination of the 
output gap (the gap between actual and efficient output). 
                                                  
35  For example, in the presence of financial market imperfections, the external finance premium 
varies in response to technology shocks, even when prices are flexible.   31
Fig. 1: Response of output and inflation to a technology shock 
 




















































































1. The figures show the response of output (left chart) and inflation (right chart) to a technology 
shock, expressed as the percentage deviation from the balanced growth path. 
2. “Weak”, “Strong”, and “Asset” all show the responses of an economy with price stickiness 
and financial market imperfections. The monetary policy rules are as follows: Weak ( t
n
t r π ~ 1 . 1 ~ = ), 
Strong ( t
n
t r π ~ 0 . 2 ~ = ), Asset ( ) ~ ~ ( 5 . 0 ~ 0 . 2 ~ *
t t t
n
t q q r − + = π ). “Natural” represents the response of the 
economy with flexible prices and financial market imperfections. “Efficient” represents the 
response of the economy with flexible prices and no financial market imperfections. 
3. Response of inflation not shown for flexible prices.   32
Fig. 2: Response of output and inflation to a net worth shock 
 


















































































1. The figures show the response of output (left chart) and inflation (right chart) to a shock to 
the net worth of entrepreneurs, expressed as the percentage deviation from the balanced growth 
path. 
2. “Weak”, “Strong”, and “Asset” all show the responses of an economy with price stickiness 
and financial market imperfections. The monetary policy rules are as follows: Weak ( t
n
t r π ~ 1 . 1 ~ = ), 
Strong ( t
n
t r π ~ 0 . 2 ~ = ), Asset ( ) ~ ~ ( 5 . 0 ~ 0 . 2 ~ *
t t t
n
t q q r − + = π ). “Natural” represents the response of the 
economy with flexible prices and financial market imperfections. “Efficient” represents the 
response of the economy with flexible prices and no financial market imperfections. 
3. Response of inflation not shown for flexible prices.   33
Table 1: Variance of output gap and inflation under technology shocks 
 
  Output 
Gap 
Variance 
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) ~ var( t π    
Monetary policy rule with inflation only:  t
n
t r π φπ
~ ~ =  
π φ  =  1.1  0.689  0.054  0.393  0.241  0.074  0.381 
π φ  =  2.0  0.430  0.003  0.393  0.033  0.006  0.218 
Monetary policy rule with inflation and asset price gap:  ) ~ ~ ( ~ ~ *
t t q t
n
t q q r − + = φ π φπ  
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  0.1  0.385  0.002  0.393  –0.011  0.004  0.195 
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  0.5  0.272  0.020  0.393  –0.141  0.031  0.151 
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  1.0  0.202  0.056  0.393  –0.246  0.083  0.143 
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  1.5  0.165  0.091  0.393  –0.319  0.132  0.149 
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  2.0  0.142  0.123  0.393  –0.373  0.176  0.159 
Monetary policy rule with strong response to inflation:  t
n
t r π φπ
~ ~ =  
π φ  =  5.0  0.403  0.001  0.393  0.009  0.001  0.201 
 
Notes: 
1. The breakdown of the output gap variance is based on the following equation: 














t t y y y y y y y y y y − − + − + − = − . 
2. The welfare loss is calculated as (output gap variance) × 0.5 + (inflation variance) × 0.5. 
3. Both the private sector and the central bank are assumed to have perfect information 
regarding technology shocks.   34
Table 2: Variance of output gap and inflation under net worth shocks 
 
  Output 
Gap 
Variance 




  ) ~ ~ var(
e
t t y y −
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t t y y y y − −
 
) ~ var( t π    
Monetary policy rule with inflation only:  t
n
t r π φπ
~ ~ =  
π φ  =  1.1  1.734  0.073  1.213  0.448  0.109  0.922 
π φ  =  2.0  1.281  0.002  1.213  0.066  0.002  0.642 
Monetary policy rule with inflation and asset price gap:  ) ~ ~ ( ~ ~ *
t t q t
n
t q q r − + = φ π φπ  
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  0.1  1.134  0.002  1.213  –0.082  0.004  0.569 
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  0.5  0.787  0.094  1.213  –0.520  0.134  0.461 
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  1.0  0.601  0.258  1.213  –0.871  0.362  0.481 
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  1.5  0.517  0.415  1.213  –1.112  0.574  0.545 
π φ  =  2.0,  q φ  =  2.0  0.476  0.554  1.213  –1.291  0.756  0.616 
Monetary policy rule with strong response to inflation:  t
n
t r π φπ
~ ~ =  
π φ  =  5.0  1.231  0.0001  1.213  0.017  0.0001  0.615 
 
Notes: 
1. The breakdown of the output gap variance is based on the following equation: 














t t y y y y y y y y y y − − + − + − = − . 
2. The welfare loss is calculated as (output gap variance) × 0.5 + (inflation variance) × 0.5.   35
Table 3: Performance of monetary policy rules when the central bank 
has imperfect information about the source of asset price movements 
 
  Economy with Price Stickiness Only  Economy with Price Stickiness and 
Financial Market Imperfections 












q φ  =  0.1  0.001  0.005  0.003  0.385  0.006  0.195 
q φ  =  0.5  0.001  0.007  0.004  0.272  0.035  0.154 
q φ  =  1.0  0.001  0.010  0.005  0.203  0.089  0.146 
q φ  =  1.5  0.002  0.011  0.006  0.166  0.139  0.152 
q φ  =  2.0  0.002  0.012  0.007  0.143  0.182  0.163 
 
Notes: 
1. The monetary policy rule is  ) ~ ~ ( ~ 0 . 2 ~ *
t t q t
n
t q q r − + = φ π . 
2. The welfare loss is calculated as (output gap variance) × 0.5 + (inflation variance) × 0.5. 